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Abstract
Proactive obfuscation is a new method for creating server replicas that
are likely to have fewer shared vulnerabilities. It uses semantics-preserving
code transformations to generate diverse executables, periodically restart-
ing servers with these fresh versions. The periodic restarts help bound the
number of compromised replicas that a service ever concurrently runs, and
therefore proactive obfuscation makes an adversary’s job harder. Proactive
obfuscation was used in implementing two prototypes: a distributed ﬁrewall
based on state-machine replication and a distributed storage service based on
quorum systems. Costs intrinsic to supporting proactive obfuscation were
quantiﬁed by measuring the performance of these prototypes.
1 Introduction
Independence of replica failures is crucial when using replication to implement
reliable distributed services. But replicas that use the same code share the same
vulnerabilities and, therefore, do not fail independently when under attack. This
paper introduces a new method of restoring some measure of that independence,
proactiveobfuscation, wherebyeachreplicaisperiodicallyrestartedusingafreshly
generated, diverse executable. Thus, the chances are reduced that an adversary can
compromise too many of the replicas that constitute a service.
We designed and implemented mechanisms to support proactive obfuscation.
And we used these mechanisms to implement prototypes of two services: (i) a
distributed ﬁrewall (based on the pf packet ﬁlter [36] in OpenBSD [34]) and (ii)
a distributed storage service. Each service uses a different approach to replica
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1management—we chose approaches commonly used to build network services that
require a high degree of resilience to server failure.1
Proactive obfuscation employs program obfuscation for automatically creat-
ing diverse executables during compilation, loading, or at run-time. Address re-
ordering and stack padding [17, 5, 51], system call reordering [11], instruction
set randomization [24, 3, 2], and heap randomization [4] are all examples. They
each produce obfuscated executables, which are believed more likely to crash in
response to certain classes of attacks rather than fall under the control of an ad-
versary. For instance, success of a buffer overﬂow attack typically will depend on
stack layout details, so replicas using differently obfuscated executables based on
address reordering or stack padding are likely to crash instead of succumbing to
adversary control.
Obfuscation techniques are becoming common in commercial operating sys-
tems. For example, Windows Vista, OpenBSD, and Linux employ obfuscation,
either by default or in easily-installed modules. And it has recently been suggested
[44] that obfuscation be used for computer monocultures in order to preserve the
beneﬁts of using the same software on clients while mitigating against a catas-
trophic response to a single attack vector.
We distinguish between two kinds of replica failures. A replica can be crashed;
a crashed replica does not perform any actions until it reboots. Or, a replica can be
compromised because it has failed or come under control of an adversary. In the
fault-tolerance literature, this second kind of failure is often called Byzantine. But
the deﬁnition of Byzantine failure presumes replica failures are independent. So,
to emphasize that attacks may cause correlated failures, we instead use the term
“compromised”. A replica that is not crashed or compromised is correct. Clients
of a distributed service may also be crashed, compromised, or correct.
Servers running obfuscated executables might share fewer vulnerabilities, but
this artiﬁcially-created independence erodes over time, because an adversary with
access to an obfuscated executable can analyze the obfuscated code and customize
an attack based on that analysis. So, eventually, all replicas will be compromised.
Proactive obfuscation defends against this by introducing epochs; a server is re-
booted in each epoch, and, therefore, n servers have been rebooted after n epochs
have elapsed. The approaches to replica management used by our prototypes are
designed to tolerate at most some threshold t of compromised replicas out of n to-
tal replicas. Using proactive obfuscation with epoch length  seconds implies that
an adversary is forced to compromise more than t replicas in n seconds in order
1Speciﬁcally, theﬁrewallusesstate-machinereplicationandthedistributedstorageserviceisbuilt
using a dissemination quorum system. The primary/backup approach is sometimes used for replica
management, but it only handles certain benign failure models. So, applying proactive obfuscation
to the primary/backup approach at best would yield a system that is not resilient to attack.
2to subvert the service. And we can make the compromise of more than t replicas
ever more difﬁcult by reducing , although  is obviously bounded from below
by the time needed to reobfuscate and reboot a single server replica.
Proactive obfuscation seeks to improve the independence of the code at dif-
ferent replicas. Some approaches to replica management also support data in-
dependence, whereby different replicas store different states. Replicated systems
that support data independence are less vulnerable to certain attacks. For exam-
ple, some implementation ﬂaws can be exercised only when a replica is in a given
state—if replicas have data independence, then an attack that exploits such an im-
plementation ﬂaw will not necessarily succeed at all replicas.
Neither replication nor proactive obfuscation can enhance the conﬁdentiality
of data stored by replicas. For some applications, conﬁdentiality can be enforced
by storing data in encrypted form under a different key on each server. And cryp-
tographic techniques have been developed for performing certain computations on
such encrypted data. Proactive obfuscation does not interfere with the use of these
techniques.
Further, neither replication nor proactive obfuscation defends against denial of
service (DoS) attacks, which decrease availability. Adversaries executing DoS at-
tacks rely on one of two strategies: saturating a resource, like a network, that is not
under the control of the replicas, or sending messages that saturate replicas. This
second strategy includes DoS attacks that cause replicas to crash and subsequently
reboot.
Finally, note that proactive obfuscation is intended to augment, not replace,
techniques that reduce vulnerabilities in replica code. And proactive obfuscation
is attractive because extant techniques (e.g., safe languages or formal veriﬁcation)
have proved difﬁcult to retroﬁt on legacy systems. Network services, for instance,
are often written in C, which is neither a safe language nor amenable to formal
veriﬁcation.
In analogy with fault tolerance, we say that services resilient to attack exhibit
attack tolerance. There is a cost to achieving attack tolerance by employing proac-
tive obfuscation in conjunction with replication for fault tolerance. A contribution
of this paper is to quantify that additional cost. We proceed as follows. Proac-
tive obfuscation is presented in x2 along with mechanisms for its implementation.
Then, x3 gives an overview of the state machine approach to replica management
and describes and evaluates a ﬁrewall prototype. Quorum systems are the sub-
ject of x4 along with a description and evaluation of a storage-service prototype.
Finally, x5 contains a discussion and a summary of related work.
32 Proactive Obfuscation for Replicated Systems
An obfuscator takes two inputs—a program P and a secret key —and produces
an obfuscated program ^ P semantically equivalent to P. Key  speciﬁes how trans-
formations are applied to produce ^ P from P. We abstract from the details of the
obfuscator by deﬁning properties we expect it approximates:
(2.1) Obfuscation Independence. For t > 1, the amount of work an ad-
versary requires to compromise t obfuscated replicas is 
(t) times the work
needed to compromise one replica.
(2.2) Bounded Adversary. The time needed for an adversary to compro-
mise t+1 replicas is greater than the time needed to reobfuscate, reboot, and
recover n replicas.
Obfuscation Independence (2.1) implies that different obfuscated executables ex-
hibit some measure of independence. Therefore, a single attack is unlikely to com-
promise multiple replicas. Obfuscation techniques being advocated for systems to-
day attempt to approximate Obfuscation Independence (2.1). Given enough time,
however, an adversary might still be able to compromise t + 1 replicas. But Ob-
fuscation Independence (2.1) and Bounded Adversary (2.2) together imply that
periodically reobfuscating and rebooting replicas nevertheless makes it harder for
adversaries to maintain control over more than t compromised replicas. In partic-
ular, by the time an adversary could have compromised t + 1 obfuscated replicas,
all n will have been reobfuscated and rebooted (with the adversary evicted), so no
more than t replicas are ever compromised.
It might seem that an adversary could invalidate Obfuscation Independence
(2.1) and Bounded Adversary (2.2) by performing attacks on replicas in parallel.
That is, the adversary sends separate attacks independently to each replica. To
prevent such parallel attacks, we employ an architecture that ensures any input
processed by one replica is, by design, processed by all. Attacks sent in parallel
to different replicas are now processed serially by all replicas. The differently
obfuscated replicas are likely to crash when they process most of these attacks,
so the rate at which an adversary can explore different possible attacks is severely
limited, and the parallelism does not really help.
2.1 Mechanisms to Support Proactive Obfuscation
The time needed to reobfuscate, reboot, and recover all n replicas in a replicated
system is determined by the amount of code at each replica and by the costs of
executing mechanisms for coordinating the replicas and performing reboot and
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Figure 1: Implementing proactive obfuscation
recovery. Figure 1 depicts an implementation of a replicated service and identiﬁes
3 mechanisms needed for supporting proactive obfuscation: Reply Synthesis, State
Recovery, and Replica Refresh.
Clients send inputs to replicas. Each replica implements the same interface
as a centralized service, processes these inputs, and sends its outputs to clients. To
transformoutputsfromthemanyreplicasintoanoutputfromthereplicatedservice,
clients employ an output synthesis function f, where  speciﬁes the minimum
number of distinct replicas from which a reply is needed. In addition to being from
distinct replicas, the replies used by f must also be output similar—a property
deﬁned separately for each approach to replica management and output synthesis
function. Reply Synthesis is the mechanism that we postulate to implement this
output synthesis function.
Some means of authentication must be available in order for Reply Synthesis
to distinguish outputs from distinct replicas; replica management also could need
authentication for doing inter-replica coordination. These authentication require-
ments are summarized as follows.
(2.3) Authenticated Channels. Each replica has authenticated channels
from all other replicas and to all clients.
Replicas keep state that may change in response to processing client inputs.
The State Recovery mechanism enables a replica to recover state after rebooting,
so the replica can continue participating in the replicated service. Speciﬁcally,
recovering replicas receive states from multiple replicas and convert them into a
single state. Recovering replicas employ a state synthesis function g for this,
where  speciﬁes the minimum number of distinct replicas from which state is
needed. Analogous to output synthesis, the replies used by g must be state sim-
ilar—a property deﬁned separately for each approach to replica management and
state synthesis function.
5The Replica Refresh mechanism periodically reboots servers, informs replicas
of epoch changes, and provides freshly obfuscated executables to replicas. For
Replica Refresh to evict the adversary from a compromised replica, we require:
(2.4) Replica Reboot. Any replica, whether compromised or not, can be
made to reboot by Replica Refresh.
(2.5) Executable Generation. Executables used by recovering replicas are
kept secret from other replicas and are generated by a correct host.
Replica Reboot (2.4) guarantees that no replica can be controlled indeﬁnitely by
the adversary. Executable Generation (2.5) ensures that replicas reboot using exe-
cutables that have not been analyzed or modiﬁed by an adversary.
The number of replicas needed to implement proactive obfuscation depends, in
part, on the number of concurrently rebooting replicas. There must be enough non-
rebootingcorrectreplicastorunStateRecovery. Toboundthisnumber, weassume
an upper bound on the amount of state at each replica and make the following
assumptions about clock synchronization and message delays.
(2.6) ApproximatelySynchronizedClocks. Thedifferencebetweenclocks
on different correct hosts is bounded.
(2.7) Timely Links. Messages sent on a link are either lost or are received
in a bounded amount of time. There is a bound on the fraction of messages
that are lost.
Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6) and Timely Links (2.7) imply that the
system implements the synchronous model [29]. Together, they are used to guaran-
tee a bound on the time involved in running State Recovery after a replica reboots.
Epoch length must be chosen to exceed this bound so that replicas have enough
time to recover before others reboot. The epoch length determines the window of
vulnerability for the service: the interval of time in which a compromise of t + 1
replicas leads to the service being compromised.
2.2 Mechanism Implementation
Implementing proactive obfuscation requires instantiating each of the mechanisms
just described. Figure 2 depicts an architecture for an implementation.
Clients send inputs to replicas and receive outputs on lossy networks labeled
input network and output network, respectively, in Figure 2. Reply Synthesis is
performed by clients. State Recovery is performed by replicas using a lossy net-
work, labeled internal service network, that satisﬁes Timely Links (2.7). Replica
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Figure 2: The prototype architecture
Refresh is implemented either by a host (called the Controller and assumed to be
correct) or by decentralized protocols.
If we design the Controller so it never attempts to receive messages, then the
Controller cannot be affected in any way by hosts in its environment. Because it
cannot be affected by other hosts, the Controller cannot be attacked. The Controller
can still send messages on the reboot network connected to all replicas; so, this
network is used to provide boot code to replicas. The diode symbol in Figure 2 on
the line from the Controller depicts the constraint that the Controller never receives
messages on the reboot network.
Whether using the Controller or decentralized protocols, Replica Reboot (2.4)
is implemented by a reboot clock that consists of a timer for each replica. The re-
boot clock uses a remote-control power strip in order to toggle power to individual
replicas when the timer goes off for that replica. Replicas are rebooted in order
mod n, one per epoch.
Epoch change can be signaled to replicas either by messages from the Con-
troller or by timeouts. In either case, for any epoch change, the elapsed time be-
tween the ﬁrst correct replica changing epochs and the last correct replica changing
epochs is bounded, due to Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6) and Timely
Links (2.7). Epochs are labeled with monotonically increasing epoch numbers that
are incremented at each epoch change. For epoch changes with our decentralized
protocols, we use timeouts because the reboot clock takes no input and cannot send
messages to replicas.
72.2.1 Reply Synthesis
To perform Reply Synthesis with output synthesis function f, clients must receive
output-similar replies from  distinct replicas. We have experimented with two
different implementations of Reply Synthesis.
Intheﬁrst, eachreplicahasitsownprivatekey, andclientsauthenticatedigitally-
signedindividualresponsesfromreplicas; areplicachangesprivatekeysonlywhen
recovering after a reboot. Clients thus need the corresponding new public key for
a recovering replica in order to authenticate future messages from that replica. So,
the service provides a way for a rebooting replica to acquire a certiﬁcate signed by
the service for its new public key. A recovering replica reestablishes authenticated
channels with clients by acquiring such a certiﬁcate and sending this certiﬁcate2
on its ﬁrst packet after reboot.3 This method of Reply Synthesis and authentication
requires clients to receive new keys in each epoch.
In our second Reply Synthesis implementation, the entire service has a public
key that is known to all clients and replicas, and the corresponding private key is
shared (using secret sharing [46]) by the replicas. Each replica is given a share of
the private key and uses this share to compute partial signatures [13] for messages.
The secret sharing is refreshed on each epoch change, in an operation called share
refresh, but the underlying public/private key pair for the service does not change.
Consequently, clients do not need new public keys after epoch changes, unlike
in the public-key per-server Reply Synthesis implementation above. Recovering
replicas acquire their shares by a share recovery protocol.
Each replica includes a partial signature on responses it sends to clients. Only
by collecting more than some threshold number of partial signatures can a client
assemble a signature for the message. We use APSS, an asynchronous, proactive,
secret-sharing protocol [53] with an (n;t + 1) threshold cryptosystem to compute
partial signatures and perform assembly. Contributions from t + 1 different par-
tial signatures are necessary to assemble a valid signature, so a contribution from
at least one correct replica is needed. Reply Synthesis is then implemented by
checking assembled signatures using the public key for the service.
In fact, an optimization of the second Reply Synthesis implementation is pos-
sible, in which a replica—not the client—assembles a signature from partial signa-
tures received from other replicas. This replica then sends the assembled signature
with its output to the client. This optimization requires replicas to send partial sig-
natures to each other, which increases inter-replica communication for each output,
henceincreaseslatency. Buttheoptimizationreducesthechangesrequiredinclient
2Certiﬁcates contain epoch numbers to prevent replay attacks.
3Our implementation also allows clients to request certiﬁcates from replicas if they receive a
packet containing a replica/epoch combination for which they have no certiﬁcate.
8code that was designed to communicate with non-replicated services.
2.2.2 State Recovery
Normally, each replica gets to the current state by receiving and processing inputs
from clients. This, however, is not often possible after reboot, because the inputs
that led to the current state might not be available. Reboots occur periodically for
proactive obfuscation and also occur due to crashes.
To facilitate recovery after a crash, each replica writes its state to non-volatile
media after processing each input; a replica recovering from a crash (but not a
reboot for proactive obfuscation) reads this state back as the last step of recovery.
This allows a replica to acquire state without sending or receiving any messages.
So, replica crashes resemble periods of replica unavailability.4
Replicas rebooted for proactive obfuscation, however, cannot use their locally
stored state, since this state might be corrupt and might cause a replica reading it
to be compromised or to crash—recall that one goal of proactive obfuscation is to
evict the adversary from a replica. The obvious alternative to using local state is
to obtain state from other correct replicas by executing a recovery protocol. How-
ever, obfuscation may mean that replicas participating in a recovery protocol use
different internal state representations. Obfuscated replicas are therefore assumed
to implement marshaling and unmarshaling functions to convert their internal state
representation to and from some abstract representation that is the same for all
replicas.
Replicas implement a recovery protocol for State Recovery using a generaliza-
tion of a protocol by Schneider [42]. Before executing State Recovery, a recover-
ing replica i establishes authenticated channels with all replicas it communicates
with. The recovery protocol then proceeds as follows:
1. Replica i starts recording input packets and packets received from other
replicas.
2. Replica i issues a state recovery request to all other replicas. The actions
taken by other replicas upon receiving this state recovery request depend on
the approach to replica management in use, but these actions must guarantee
that correct replicas eventually send state-similar replies to replica i.
3. Upon receiving  state-similar replies, replica i applies state synthesis func-
tion g.
4This method of handling crashes only works for transient errors and for attacks that cause repli-
cas to crash without writing state to disk. The period of unavailability begins just before receipt of
the offending input. See x5 for a discussion of crashes caused as part of DoS attacks.
94. Replica i replays all packets recorded due to step 1 as if they were received
for the ﬁrst time and stops recording.
To be useful, State Recovery must terminate in a bounded amount of time; oth-
erwise, a recovering replica from one epoch might still be recovering when the
next replica is rebooted, violating one of our assumptions about epochs. Timely
Links (2.7) and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6), along with the assump-
tion that the state at each replica is ﬁnite, guarantees that steps 2 and 3 complete in
a bounded amount of time.
But we must also guarantee that step 4 completes in a bounded amount of time.
That is, replicas must be able replay and process recorded packets while continu-
ing to receive and record packets, and this processing must terminate in a bounded
amount of time. Recorded packets must therefore be processed more quickly than
packets are received. This means there will be a maximum speed at which a repli-
cated system using proactive obfuscation can process inputs. This maximum speed
depends on how quickly a recovering replica can process its recorded packets and
must be enough slower so that step 4 can terminate in a bounded amount of time.5
2.2.3 Replica Refresh
Replica Refresh involves 3 distinct functions: (i) reboot and epoch change noti-
ﬁcation, (ii) executable reobfuscation, and (iii) key distribution for implementing
authenticated channels between replicas. We explored two different implementa-
tions of Replica Refresh. One is centralized, and the other is decentralized.
CentralizedControllerSolution. AcentralizedimplementationofReplicaRefresh
can be quite efﬁcient. For instance, a centralized implementation can provide
epoch-change notiﬁcation directly to replicas, can reobfuscate executables in paral-
lel with replicas rebooting, and can generate keys and sign their certiﬁcates instead
of running a distributed key refresh protocol.
RebootandEpochChange. Torebootareplica, theControllertogglesaremote-
controlpower strip. Immediatelyafterthereboot completes, theController usesthe
reboot network to send a message to all replicas, informing them of the reboot and
associated epoch change.
Executable Reobfuscation. The Controller itself obfuscates and compiles ex-
ecutables of the operating system and application source code. By assumption, this
5In our implementations, this bound was not found to be a signiﬁcant restriction.
10guarantees that executables are generated by a correct host, as required by Exe-
cutable Generation (2.5). Executables are transferred to recovering replicas via the
reboot network using a network boot protocol. To guarantee that no other replicas
learn information about the executable and to prevent other replicas from providing
boot code, we require that the reboot network implement a separate conﬁdential
channel from the Controller to each replica. Replicas may not send packets on
these channels.
(2.8) Reboot Channels. The Controller can send conﬁdential information
to each replica on the reboot network, no replicas can send any message on
the reboot network, and clients cannot access the reboot network at all.
So, the reboot network is isolated and cannot be attacked. Therefore, any exe-
cutable received on the reboot network comes from the Controller.
A simple but expensive way to implement Reboot Channels (2.8) would be
to have pairwise channels between each replica and the Controller. A less costly
implementation involves using a single switch with ports that can be toggled on
and off by the Controller. Then the Controller can communicate directly with ex-
actly one replica by turning off all other ports on the switch. SNMP-controlled [8]
modern switches allow such control of individual ports by a third party like the
Controller.
Instead of using TCP to communicate with a host providing an executable
(since TCP-based methods like PXE boot [23] require bidirectional communica-
tion with the Controller), a recovering replica monitors the reboot network until it
receives a predeﬁned sequence that signals the beginning of an executable. Then,
the replica copies this executable and boots from it.6
Key Distribution. The Controller performs key distribution to implement au-
thenticated channels by generating a new public/private RSA [40] key pair for each
recoveringreplicaiandcertifyingthepublickeytoallreplicasatthetimeireboots.
The new key pair along with public keys and certiﬁcates for each replica in the cur-
rent epoch are written into an executable for i.7 Reboot Channels (2.8) guarantees
that other replicas cannot observe the executable sent from the Controller to a re-
booting replica, so they cannot learn the new private key for i.
6A simpler boot procedure is possible, since a recovering replica that has not yet read input from
any network is correct by assumption. Replicas known to be correct could be allowed to send and
receive messages with the Controller. This boot procedure requires modifying Reboot Channels (2.8)
as noted above to require the necessary control over which replicas can output to the reboot network.
7The Controller could include in this executable new public keys for replicas to be rebooted later.
These keys are not included in order to deprive adversaries access to the keys as long as possible.
11Decentralized Protocols Solution. The centralized Controller provides a simple
way to implement Replica Refresh but is a single point of failure. Decentralized
schemes tend to be more expensive but can avoid the single point of failure of
centralized schemes.
Reboot and Epoch Change. We have not explored decentralized replica re-
boot mechanisms, because reboot depends on a remote-control power strip that is
itself potentially a single point of failure. Decentralized epoch change notiﬁcation
can be achieved, however, by using timeouts, as discussed at the beginning of x2.2.
Executable Reobfuscation. Replicas can each generate their own obfuscated
executables in order to satisfy Executable Generation (2.5). It sufﬁces that each
replica be trusted to boot from correct (i.e., unmodiﬁed) code; this trust is justiﬁed
if the actions of the replica boot code cannot be modiﬁed:
(2.9) Read-Only Boot Code. The semantics of boot code on replicas can-
not be modiﬁed by an adversary.
This assumption can be discharged if two conditions hold: (i) the BIOS is not
modiﬁable8, and(ii)thebootcode isstoredonaread-onlymedium. Ourprototypes
assume (i) holds and discharge (ii) by employing a CD-ROM to store an OpenBSD
systemthat, oncebooted, usessourceontheCD-ROMtobuildafreshlyobfuscated
executable.9
After a newly obfuscated executable is built, it must be booted. This requires
a way for a running kernel to boot an executable on disk or else a way to force a
CPU to reboot from a different device after booting a CD-ROM (i.e., from the disk
instead of the CD-ROM). The former is not supported in OpenBSD (although it is
supported by kexec in Linux). The latter requires a way to switch boot devices, but
Read-Only Boot Code (2.9) implies the code on the CD-ROM cannot change the
BIOS in order to accomplish this switch.
In our prototypes, we resolved this dilemma by employing a timer. It forces
the server to switch between booting from the CD-ROM and from the hard disk, as
follows. The BIOS on each server is set to boot from a CD-ROM if any is present
and otherwise to boot from the hard disk. On reboot, the reboot clock not only tog-
gles power to the server but also begins providing power to the server’s CD-ROM
8This, in turn, can be implemented using a secure co-processor like the Trusted Platform Module
[49].
9Our prototypes actually boot from a read-only ﬂoppy, which then copies an OpenBSD system
and source from a CD-ROM to the hard disk and runs it from there. We describe the implementation
in terms of a single CD-ROM here for ease of exposition.
12drive. The server boots, ﬁnds the CD-ROM (so boots from that device), executes,
and writes its newly obfuscated executable to its hard drive. The timer then turns
off power to the CD-ROM and toggles server power, causing the processor to re-
boot again. The server now fails to ﬁnd a functioning CD-ROM, so it boots from
the hard disk, using the freshly obfuscated executable.
Key Distribution. In the decentralized implementation for this function, a re-
covering replica itself generates a new public/private key pair. It must then estab-
lish and disseminate a certiﬁcate for this new public key. Key generation can be
performed by a rebooting replica locally if we assume that each replica has a suf-
ﬁcient source of randomness. To establish and disseminate a certiﬁcate, we use a
simpliﬁed version of a proactive key refresh protocol designed by Canetti, Halevi,
and Herzberg [7]. This protocol employs threshold cryptography: each replica
has shares of a private key for the service. A recovering replica submits a key re-
quest for its freshly generated public key to other replicas; they compute partial
signatures for this key using their shares. These partial signatures can be used to
reassemble a signature for a certiﬁcate. For veriﬁcation of the reassembled signa-
ture on a certiﬁcate to work, we assume the public key of the service is known to
all hosts.
A recovering replica must know the current epoch before running the recovery
protocol, since it needs authenticated channels with other replicas, and the certiﬁ-
cates used to establish these channels are only valid for a given set of epochs. A
recovering replica learns the current epoch from its valid reassembled certiﬁcate.
To prevent too many shares from leaking to mobile adversaries, shares of the
service key used to create partial signatures for submitted keys are refreshed by
APSS at each epoch change, using the share refresh protocol.
To prevent more than one key from being signed per epoch, replicas use Byzan-
tine Paxos [28], a distributed agreement protocol, to decide on the key request to
use for a given recovering replica; correct replicas produce partial signatures in
this epoch only for the key speciﬁed in this key request. Note that if replicas are
allowed to create partial signatures for any single key in each epoch, and only t+1
partial signatures are required for signature reassembly, then up to n t keys might
be signed per epoch. This is because there are at most t compromised replicas and
at least n   t correct replicas; the t compromised replicas could generate n   t
keys, submit each to a different correct replica, and themselves produce t partial
signatures for each, since each compromised replica can produce multiple different
partial signatures. So, there would be t + 1 partial signatures (hence a certiﬁcate)
for n   t different keys. But if Byzantine Paxos is used to decide which key to
sign, then the set of correct replicas will sign at most one key. Only one certiﬁcate
13can be produced for each epoch, since one correct replica must contribute a partial
signature to a reassembled signature.10
This key distribution scheme does not guarantee that a recovering replica will
succeed in getting a new key signed—only that some replica will. So a compro-
mised replica might get a key signed in the place of a recovering correct replica.
However, if recovering replica i receives a certiﬁcate purporting to be for the cur-
rent epoch but using a different key than i requested, then i knows that some com-
promised replica established the certiﬁcate in its place, and i can alert a human
operator. This operator can check and reboot compromised replicas. However, i
cannot convince other replicas in the service.
2.3 Mechanism Performance
Assumptions invariably bring vulnerabilities. Yet implementations having fewer
assumptionsaretypicallymoreexpensive. Forinstance, decentralizedprotocolsfor
Replica Refresh require more network communication (an expense) than central-
ized protocols, but dependence on a single host in the centralized protocols brings
a vulnerability. The trade-offs between different instantiations of the mechanisms
of x2.2 mostly involve incurring higher CPU costs for increased decentralization.
Under high load, these CPU costs divert a replica’s resources away from input han-
dling. We use throughput and latency, two key performance metrics for network
services, to characterize these costs for each mechanism.
2.3.1 Reply Synthesis
Implementing Reply Synthesis with individual authentication between replicas and
clients requires reestablishing keys with clients at reboot, but this cost is infrequent
and small. The major cost of individual authentication in our prototype arises in
generating digital signatures for output packets.
The threshold cryptography implementation of Reply Synthesis computes par-
tial signatures for each output packet. And partial signatures take even more CPU
time to generate than ordinary digital signatures. So, under high load, the indi-
vidual authentication scheme admits higher throughput and lower latency than the
threshold cryptography scheme.
Throughput can be improved in both of our Reply Synthesis implementations
by batching output—instead of signing each output packet, replicas opportunisti-
cally produce a single signature for a batch of output packets up to a maximum
10Another solution would be to use an (n;d
n+t+1
2 e) threshold cryptosystem, since then only one
key could be signed. But the implementation of APSS used in our prototypes does not support this
threshold efﬁciently.
14batch size, called the batching factor. This batching allows cryptographic compu-
tations (in particular, digital signatures) used in authentication to be performed less
frequently and thus reduces the CPU load on the replicas and the client.
2.3.2 State Recovery
The cost of State Recovery depends directly on how much state must be recovered.
Large state transfers consume network bandwidth and CPU time, both at the send-
ing and receiving replicas. So, when recovering replicas must recover a large state
under high load, State Recovery leads to signiﬁcant degradation of throughput and
latency.
2.3.3 Replica Refresh
The performance characteristics of Replica Refresh differ signiﬁcantly between the
centralized and decentralized implementations. Reboot and epoch change notiﬁca-
tion make little difference to performance—epoch change notiﬁcation only takes
a short amount of time, and reboot involves only the remote-control power strip.
Centralized Executable Reobfuscation is performed by the Controller directly, and
the resulting executable is transferred over the reboot network, so this has little
effect on performance. However, decentralized Executable Reobfuscation signiﬁ-
cantly increases the window of vulnerability, because reobfuscation cannot occur
while a replica is rebooting, since replicas perform their own reobfuscation. So,
reboot and reobfuscation now must be executed serially instead of in parallel.
Choosing between centralized and decentralized key distribution is also crucial
to performance. Decentralized key distribution uses APSS, which must perform
share refresh at each epoch change. Our implementation of APSS borrows code
from CODEX [31]. And APSS share refresh requires signiﬁcant CPU resources
in the CODEX implementation of APSS, so we should expect to see a drop in
throughput and an increase in latency during its execution. Further, a rebooting
replica must acquire shares during recovery, and this share recovery protocol re-
quires non-trivial CPU resources; we thus should expect to see a second, smaller,
drop in throughput and increase in latency during replica recovery. The key dis-
tribution protocol itself only involves signing a single key and performing a single
round of Byzantine Paxos, so its contribution to performance is negligible.
3 State Machine Replica Management
The state machine approach [25, 43] provides a way to build a reliable distributed
service that implements the same interface as a program running on a single trust-
15worthy host. Using it, a program is described as a state machine, which consists of
state variables and deterministic11 commands that modify state variables and may
produce output.
Given a state machine m, a state machine ensemble SME(m) consists of n
servers that each implement the same interface as m and accept client requests to
execute commands. Each server runs a replica of m and coordinates client com-
mands so that each correct replica starts in the same state, transitions through the
same states, and generates the same outputs. Notice that correct replicas in the state
machine approach store the same state and, therefore, the state machine approach
does not create data independence.
Coordination of client commands to servers is not one of the mechanisms iden-
tiﬁed in Figure 1. For a service that employs the state machine approach, a client
must employ some sort of Input Coordination mechanism to communicate with all
replicas in a state machine ensemble. This mechanism will involve replicas run-
ning an agreement algorithm [27, 14] to decide which commands to process and in
what order. Agreement algorithms proceed in (potentially asynchronous) rounds,
where some command is chosen by the replicas in each round. In most practical
implementations, a command is proposed by a replica taking the role of leader.
The command that has been chosen is eventually learned by all correct replicas.
Replicas maintain state needed by the agreement algorithm and maintain state
variables for their state machine. For instance, Byzantine Paxos requires each
replica to store a monotonically increasing sequence number that labels the next
round of agreement. In our prototype, replicas use sequence numbers partitioned
by the epoch number; we represent the mapping from sequence number to epoch
number as a pair that we call an extended sequence number. Extended sequence
numbers are ordered lexicographically. Output produced by replicas and sent to
clients consists of the output of the state machine along with the extended sequence
number.
The combination of the extended sequence number and state variables forms
the replica state. The replica state at a correct replica that has just executed the
command chosen for extended sequence number (e;s) is denoted (e;s). There
is only one possible value for (e;s), since all correct replicas serially execute the
same commands in the same order, due to Input Coordination, and we assume that
all replicas start in the same replica state.
Although use of an agreement algorithm causes the same sequence of com-
mands to be executed by each replica, client requests may be duplicated, ignored,
11The requirement that commands be deterministic does not signiﬁcantly limit use of the state
machine approach, because non-deterministic choices in a service can often be captured as additional
arguments to commands.
16or reordered before the agreement algorithm is run. In fact, modern networks pro-
vide only a best-effort delivery guarantee, so it is reasonable to assume that clients
wouldalreadyhavebeendesignedtoaccommodatesuchperturbedrequeststreams.
3.1 A Firewall Prototype
To explore the costs and trade-offs of our mechanisms for proactive obfuscation,
we built a ﬁrewall prototype that treats pf as a state machine and uses the tech-
niques and mechanisms of x2. We chose pf as the basis of our prototype because it
is a production-quality ﬁrewall used in many real networks. Implementing our pro-
totype requires choosing an agreement algorithm for Input Coordination. We also
must instantiate the output and state synthesis functions and deﬁne the operations
that replicas perform upon receiving a state recovery request.
Input Coordination. Our ﬁrewall prototype uses Byzantine Paxos to implement
Input Coordination. The number of replicas required to execute Byzantine Paxos
while tolerating t compromised replicas is known to be 3t + 1 [9]. This number
does not take into account rebooting replicas. However, a rebooting replica does
notexhibitarbitrarybehavior—itsimplyresemblesacrashedreplica. Lamport[26]
shows that tolerating f crashed and t compromised replicas in Byzantine Paxos re-
quires3t+2f+1totalreplicas. So, ifk replicasmightberebootingsimultaneously,
then we can set f = k, and we conclude that only 3t+2k +1 replicas are needed,
which means that only 2 additional replicas must be added to tolerate each reboot-
ing one. In our prototypes, k = 1 holds, so we employ 3t + 2  1 + 1 = 3t + 3
replicas in total.
Normally, leaders in Byzantine Paxos change according to a leader recovery
protocol whenever a leader is believed by enough replicas to be crashed or com-
promised. This leads to system delays when a compromised leader merely runs
slowly, because execution speed of the state machine ensemble depends on the
speed at which the leader chooses commands for agreement. To reduce these de-
lays, we use leader rotation [15]: the leader for sequence number j is replica j
mod n. Thus, leadership changes with each sequence number, rotating among the
replicas.
With leader rotation, the impact of a slow leader is limited, since timeouts for
changing to a new leader can be made very short. Replicas set a timer for each
sequence number i; on timeout, replicas expect replica (i + 1) mod n to be the
leader. Compromised leaders cause a delay for only as long as the allowed time
to select one next command and can only cause this delay for t out of every n
17sequence numbers.12
Leaderrotationmightalsocausedelayswhilereplicasarerebootingifareboot-
ing replica is selected as the next leader, so we extend the leader rotation protocol
to handle rebooting replicas. Speciﬁcally, since there is a bounded period during
which all correct replicas learn that a replica has rebooted, correct replicas can skip
over rebooting replicas in leader rotation. This is implemented by assigning the se-
quence numbers for a rebooting replica to the next consecutive replica mod n. We
call this leader adjustment; it allows Byzantine Paxos to run without many exe-
cutions of the leader recovery protocol, even during reboots. During the interval
in which some correct replicas have not changed epochs, replicas might disagree
about which replica should be leader. But Byzantine Paxos works even in the face
of such disagreement about leaders.13
Our implementation of Byzantine Paxos is actually used to agree on hashes of
packets rather than full packet contents. Given this optimization, a leader might
propose a command for agreement even though not all replicas have received a
packet with contents that hash to this command. Each replica checks locally for
a matching packet when it receives a hash from a leader. If such a packet has not
been received, then a matching input packet is requested from the leader.14
A replica might fall behind in the execution of Byzantine Paxos. Such replicas
need some way to obtain messages they might have missed, and State Recovery is
a rather expensive mechanism to invoke for this purpose. So, replicas send what we
call RepeatRequest messages for a given type of message and extended sequence
number. Upon receiving a RepeatRequest, a replica resends the requested message
if it has a copy.15
12Leader rotation might seem inefﬁcient, because switching leaders in Byzantine Paxos requires
executing the leader recovery protocol. But Byzantine Paxos allows a well-known leader to propose
a command for num without running leader recovery, provided it is the ﬁrst to do so. Since replica
num mod n is expected by all correct replicas to be leader for sequence number num, it is a well-
known leader and does not need to run leader recovery to run a round of agreement for sequence
number num.
13The bound on the time needed for all correct replicas to learn about an epoch change is thus just
an optimization. Our implementation of Byzantine Paxos continues to operate correctly, albeit more
slowly, even if there is no bound.
14Compromised leaders are still able to invent input packets to the prototype. But a compromised
leader could always have invented such input packets simply by having a compromised client submit
them as inputs.
15In our prototype, old messages are only kept for a small ﬁxed number of recent sequence num-
bers. In general, the amount of state to keep depends on how fast the state machine ensemble pro-
cesses commands. Since replicas can always execute State Recovery instead, the minimum number
of messages to keep depends on how many messages are needed to run State Recovery, as discussed
below.
18Synthesis Functions. The output synthesis and state synthesis functions in our
ﬁrewall prototype depend on having at most t replicas be compromised, since then
any value received from t + 1 replicas must have been sent by at least one correct
replica.
There are two output synthesis functions, one for each implementation of Reply
Synthesis—in both,  is set to t + 1. Replies are considered to be output similar
for the individual authentication implementation if they contain identical outputs.
So, output synthesis using individual authentication returns any output received
in output-similar replies from t + 1 distinct replicas. Replies are considered to
be output similar for the threshold cryptography implementation if they contain
identical outputs and their partial signatures together reassemble to give a correct
signature on this output. So, output synthesis using threshold cryptography also
returns any output received in output-similar replies from t + 1 distinct replicas.
For either Reply Synthesis implementation, clients need only receive t + 1
output-similar replies. So, if at most r replicas are rebooting, and t are compro-
mised, then it sufﬁces for only 2t + r + 1 replicas to send replies to a client, since
then there will be at least 2t + r + 1   t   r = t + 1 correct replicas that reply.
And replies from t + 1 correct replicas for the same extended sequence number
are always output similar. In our prototype implementation, the leader for a given
extended sequence number and the 2t+r next replicas mod n are the only replicas
to send packets to the client for this extended sequence number.
For state synthesis,  is also set to t + 1, and replies are deﬁned to be state
similar if they contain identical replica states. So, state synthesis returns a replica
state if it has received this replica state in state-similar replies from t + 1 distinct
replicas.
State Recovery Request. State Recovery must guarantee that each recovering
replica acquires some minimum state from which it can advance by executing com-
mands. Deﬁne the current minimum state to be a replica state (e;s) such that:
 there is some correct replica with replica state (e;s), and
 if some correct replica has replica state (e0;s0), then (e;s)  (e0;s0).
Since all replicas begin in the same initial state, and rebooting puts a replica in that
initial state, we conclude that a current minimum state always exists.
Normally, the current minimum state obtained from executing State Recovery
will differ from the initial state. But even so, that state might not sufﬁce for a
recovering replica to resume operation as part of the state machine ensemble. The
recovery protocol must also satisfy the following property, which guarantees that
19replicascanalwaysrecoveratleastthecurrentminimumstateatthetimearecovery
protocol starts.
(3.1) SME State Recovery. If (e;s) is the current minimum state at the
time a replica i starts the recovery protocol, then there is a time bound 
and some (e0;s0) such that (e;s)  (e0;s0) holds and i recovers (e0;s0) in 
seconds.
The state recovery request used in State Recovery is implemented by having repli-
cas propose a special command, RecoveryRequest, for agreement; this command
containstheidentityoftherecoveringreplica. Uponchoosingthiscommand, acor-
rect replica sends its current state to the rebooting replica. Replica states are guar-
anteed to be the same for correct replicas at the same extended sequence number,
all correct replicas execute the RecoveryRequest at that same point, and there are
more than t + 1 correct replicas, so the recovering replica is guaranteed to receive
more than t + 1 identical replica states, which sufﬁces for state synthesis, since
 = t+1.16 Note that these replica states have a sequence number greater than the
current minimum state at the time the recovery protocol starts.
The time needed to execute this protocol is bounded, given Timely Links (2.7)
and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6) along with the assumed bound on
theamountofstatestoredbyanycorrectreplica. So, thisrecoveryprotocolsatisﬁes
SME State Recovery (3.1). But, as noted in x2.2.2, for State Recovery to be able
to complete in a bounded amount of time, a recovering replica must also be able to
replay its recorded packets and catch up with the other replicas in the system in a
bounded amount of time.
TheprocessingofreplayedpacketsmightrequirereplicastosendRepeatRequest
messages to request packets they missed while recording. So, after receiving a
State Recovery Request and before determining that a recovering replica has ﬁn-
ished State Recovery, replicas must keep enough packets to bring recovering repli-
cas up to date using RepeatRequest messages. The number of packets stored de-
pendsonq, thenumberofextendedsequencenumbersprocessedbyreplicasduring
State Recovery. The value of q is bounded, since the ﬁrewall is assumed to have
a bounded maximum throughput, and SME State Recovery (3.1) guarantees that
State Recovery completes in a bounded amount of time.
16An optimization is for replicas to reply immediately with their replica state the ﬁrst time they
receive a RecoveryRequest from a recovering replica, instead of running an agreement algorithm.
If a recovering replica i does not receive t+1 identical replica states from these responses, then i can
send a second RecoveryRequest; a leader for agreement chooses the second RecoveryRequest as
a command using agreement as in the State Recovery protocol. Our ﬁrewall prototype implements
this optimization, and the system has never executed a second RecoveryRequest and agreement,
because recovering replicas always got t+1 identical replica states on their ﬁrst RecoveryRequest
in the experiments we ran.
20For RepeatRequest messages to guarantee that packet replay completes in a
bounded amount of time, the rate at which commands for extended sequence num-
bers are learned via RepeatRequest messages must be faster than the rate at which
commands are handled by the ﬁrewall, hence recorded by the recovering replica.
This guarantees that the recovering replica eventually processes all the commands
it has recorded and can stop recording. So, the maximum throughput of the ﬁre-
wall must be chosen to take into account time needed to learn a command for an
extended sequence number via RepeatRequest messages (this time is bounded,
given Timely Links (2.7) and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6)). In this
case, there is a bound b on the number of extended sequence numbers that a recov-
ering replica will need to learn via RepeatRequest messages after State Recovery.
If replicas store messages for at least b extended sequence numbers, then recover-
ing replicas will be able to catch up with other replicas in a bounded amount of
time using State Recovery.
3.2 Performance of the Firewall Prototype
The performance of the ﬁrewall prototype depends on how mechanisms are imple-
mented. To quantify this, we ran experiments on various different implementations
for our ﬁrewall prototype. We consider:
 Input Coordination performed either by a variant of Byzantine Paxos that
does not support proactive obfuscation or by a variant of Byzantine Paxos
that does.
 Reply Synthesis either based on individual authentication or based on thresh-
old cryptography.
 Replica Refresh implemented either using a centralized Controller or using
decentralized protocols.
In all experiments, State Recovery employs the protocol of x2.2.2 with state re-
covery request and state synthesis as described in x3.1. The Replicated version
provides Byzantine Paxos without accounting for rebooting replicas: it does not
perform proactive obfuscation or any form of proactive recovery. The result is 5
different versions of our ﬁrewall prototype, listed in Table 1.
3.2.1 Experimental Setup
Our implementations are written in C using OpenSSL [37]; we also use OpenSSL
for key generation. We take t = 1 and n = 6; all hosts are 3 GHz Pentium 4
machines with 1 GB of RAM running OpenBSD 4.0. We can justify setting t = 1
21Version name Input Reply Replica Refresh
Coordination Synthesis epoch reobf key
Replicated Byz Paxos indvdl auth none none none
Centralized Byz Paxos indvdl auth cntrl cntrl cntrl
Decentralized Byz Paxos indvdl auth cntrl cntrl dcntrl
Reboot Clock Byz Paxos indvdl auth dcntrl dcntrl dcntrl
Threshold Client Byz Paxos thresh crypto dcntrl dcntrl dcntrl
Table 1: The versions of our ﬁrewall prototype
provided Bounded Adversary (2.2) is satisﬁed; this requires that all n = 6 replicas
be reobfuscated and rebooted before t + 1 = 2 replicas are compromised. The
epoch length in our prototype is on the order of several minutes, so we believe this
assumption to be reasonable. The Replicated version only needs 3t + 1 hosts to
run Byzantine Paxos; it has n = 4.
A host called the outside client is connected to the input network of the ﬁre-
wall prototype. A host called the inside client is connected to the output network.
The OpenBSD kernel of the inside client is modiﬁed for Reply Synthesis so that a
packet passes through the inside client’s network stack only if  = t + 1 output-
similar packets have been received. This allows applications on the inside client to
run unmodiﬁed. Replicas are connected to the output network and input network
by hubs—all replicas use the same MAC and IP address and receive all packets
sent by the outside client and inside client.
For ease of implementation, Input Coordination, Reply Synthesis, and State
Recovery execute in user space; we built a pseudo-device that transfers packets
from the kernel, as in Mogul’s ﬁrewall design [32]. The pseudo-device allows
programs running in user space to take and replace packets on the network stack,
similar to Linux netﬁlter [33].
The pf code provides a pseudo-device called pfsync [35] that marshals and
unmarshals an abstract state representation (pfsync was designed for synchroniz-
ing a backup to a primary pf ﬁrewall). The output of pfsync is a data structure
that contains information about the state of the ﬁrewall.
The prototype employs three obfuscation methods: (i) system call reordering
obfuscation [11] permutes the order of system call numbers and embeds them into
a larger space of identiﬁers, most of which do not map to valid system calls; (ii)
memory randomization is implemented by default in OpenBSD; and (iii) Propo-
lice [16] inserts and checks a random value after the return value of functions to
protect against stack-smashing attacks. However, any obfuscation method that can
be applied during compilation, linking, or loading could be used in our prototype.
22Recall, our interest is not in the details of the obfuscation but rather in the details
of the mechanisms needed to deploy obfuscation in an effective way.
The time that must elapse between reboots bounds the window of vulnerability
for cryptographic keys used by each replica. This allows replicas in our prototype
to use 512-bit RSA keys, because the risk is small that an adversary will compute
a private key from a given 512-bit public key during the relatively short window
of vulnerability in which secrecy of the key matters—one replica is rebooted each
several minutes, so each key is refreshed on the order of once per half hour.
We also use 512-bit RSA keys for the Replicated version even though it does
not perform proactive recovery and, therefore, should be using 1024-bit keys.
However, using 512-bit keys for the Replicated version allows direct performance
comparisons with the Centralized version, since the two versions then differ only
in their numbers of replicas.
Replicas batch input and output packets when possible, up to batch size 43—
this is the largest batch size possible for 1500-byte packets if output batches are
sent to clients as single packets, since the maximum length of an IP datagram is
64 kB.17 We set the batching factor to 43, because this value provided the highest
performance in our experiments.
Recall that commands for agreement are hashes of client inputs and not the
inputs themselves. So, batching input packets involves batching hashes. Replicas
also sign batched output packets for the client.
Finally, replicas in our prototype do not currently write their state to disk af-
ter executing each command, because the cost of these disk I/O operations would
obscure the costs we are trying to quantify.
3.2.2 Performance Measurements
To evaluate our different mechanism implementations for proactive obfuscation,
we measure throughput and latency. Each reported value is a mean of at least 5
runs; error bars depict the sample standard deviation of the measurements around
this mean.
3.2.2.1 Input Coordination
To quantify how throughput and latency are affected by the Input Coordination
implementation, we performed experiments in which there are no compromised,
crashed, or rebooting replicas, so Replica Refresh and State Recovery can be dis-
abled with averse effect. We consider two prototype versions that differ only in
17Implementing higher batching factors requires using or implementing a higher-level notion of
message fragmentation and reassembly.
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Figure 3: Overall throughput for the ﬁrewall prototype
their implementation of the Input Coordination mechanism: the Replicated ver-
sion and the Centralized version. Both use RSA signatures for Reply Synthesis.
Throughput. During each experiment, the outside client sends 1500 byte UDP
packets (the MTU on our network) to a particular port on the ﬁrewall; ﬁrewall rules
cause these packets to be forwarded to the inside client. Varying the timing of input
packet sends enables us to control bandwidth applied by the outside client. Figure
3 shows throughput for each of the versions.18 The curve labeled pf represents
the performance of the pf ﬁrewall running on a single server; it handles an applied
load of up to at least 12.5 MB/s—considerably higher bandwidths than we tested.
The Centralized version throughput reaches a maximum of about 3180 kB/s,
whereastheReplicatedversionreachesamaximumthroughputofabout3450kB/s.
So, the Centralized version reaches about 92% of the throughput of the Replicated
version under high load. This suggests that the cost of adding proactive obfuscation
to an already-replicated system is not excessive.
The Replicated version and the Centralized version throughputs peak due to
CPU saturation. Some of the CPU costs result from the use of digital signatures
to sign packets both for Input Coordination and for Reply Synthesis. These per-
packet costs are amortized across multiple packets by batching, so these costs can
be reduced signiﬁcantly. The other major cost, which cannot be reduced in our
implementation, arises from copying packets between the kernel and mechanism
implementations running in user space. Multiple system calls to our pseudo-device
18Discussion of the Threshold Client curve appears below in x3.2.2.2.
24are performed for each packet received by the kernel. Reducing this cost requires
implementing the mechanisms for proactive obfuscation in the kernel.
Throughput decreases for both the Replicated and the Centralized versions af-
ter saturation. This decrease occurs because the higher applied load means that
replicas spend more time dropping packets. And packets in the ﬁrewall prototype
are copied into user space and deleted from the kernel before being handled. So,
dropped packets still consume non-trivial CPU resources.
The choice of batching factor and the choice of timeout for leader recovery
affect throughput when a replica has crashed. To quantify this effect, we ran an
experiment similar to the one for Figure 3, but with one replica crashed. While
the replica was crashed, throughput in the Centralized version drops to 1133  10
kB/s.19 The decrease in throughput when one replica is crashed occurs because the
failed replica cannot act as leader when its turn comes, and therefore replicas must
wait for a timeout (chosen to be 200 ms in this version) each 6 sequence numbers,
at which point the next consecutive replica runs the leader recovery protocol and
acts as leader for this sequence number.
Latency. Latency in the ﬁrewall prototype is also affected by the choice of Input
Coordination implementation. In the same experiment as used to produce Figure
3, latency was measured at 39  3 ms for the Centralized version, whereas latency
in the Replicated version was 28  6 ms under the same circumstances. This
difference is due to replicas in the Replicated version needing to handle fewer
replies from replicas per message round in the execution of Input Coordination.
Unlike throughput, however, latency is not affected by the batching factor,
since latency depends only on the time needed to execute the agreement algo-
rithm.20 And batching is opportunistic, so replicas do not wait to ﬁll batches. This
also keeps batching from increasing latency.
To understand the latency when one replica is crashed, we ran a different exper-
iment where the outside client sent 1500-byte packets, but with one replica crashed.
With a crashed replica, latency increases to 342  60 ms for the Centralized ver-
sion. This increase is because packets normally handled by the failed replica must
wait for a timeout and leader recovery before being handled. This slowdown re-
duces the throughput of the ﬁrewall, causing input-packet queues to build up on
replicas. Latency for each packet then increases to include the time needed to pro-
19Linear changes in the batching factor provide proportional changes in the throughput during
replica failure: the same experiment with a batching factor of 32 leads to a throughput of 873  18
kB/s.
20Of course, larger batching factors cause replicas to transmit more data on the network for each
packet, and this increases the time to execute agreement. But this increase is negligible in all cases
we examined.
25cess all packets ahead of it in the queue. And some packets in the queue have to
wait for the timeout. In the Centralized version, the timeout is set to 200 ms, so the
latency during failure is higher, as would be expected.
3.2.2.2 Reply Synthesis
Throughput. Throughput for different Reply Synthesis implementations is al-
readygiveninFigure3, becauseinanexperimentwherenoReplicaRefresh occurs,
any differences between the Centralized version and the Threshold Client version
can be attributed solely to their different implementations of Reply Synthesis: the
Centralized version uses RSA signatures, whereas the Threshold Client version
uses threshold RSA signatures.
Figure 3 conﬁrms the prediction of x2.3.1: the Threshold Client version ex-
hibits signiﬁcantly lower throughput, due to the high CPU costs of the calculations
required for generating partial signatures using the threshold cryptosystem used
in the CODEX implementation of APSS. Compare the maximum throughput of
397 kB/s with 3180 kB/s measured for the Centralized version, which does not use
threshold cryptography.
Latency. Latency for the Threshold Client version (measured in the same ex-
periment as for throughput) is 413  38 ms as compared with 39  3 ms for the
Centralized version. Again, this difference is due to high CPU overhead of thresh-
old RSA signatures.
3.2.2.3 Replica Refresh
We evaluate the three tasks of Replica Refresh separately for both the centralized
and the decentralized implementations. Due to the high costs of threshold cryptog-
raphy, we use RSA signatures for Reply Synthesis throughout these experiments.
We set the outside client to send at 3300 kB/s, slightly above the throughput satu-
ration threshold.
We measured no differences in throughput or latency in our experiments for
the two different implementations of replica reboot and epoch-change notiﬁcation.
The time required to generate an obfuscated executable affects elapsed time be-
tween reboots. Obfuscating and rebuilding a 22 MB executable (containing all our
kernel and user code) using the obfuscation methods employed by our prototype
takes about 13 minutes with CD-ROM-based executable generation at the replicas
and takes 2.5 minutes with a centralized Controller; reboot takes about 2 minutes
in both. Both versions allow about 30 seconds for State Recovery, which is more
than sufﬁcient in our experiments.
26A Controller can perform reobfuscation for one replica while another replica
is rebooting, so reobfuscation and reboot can be overlapped. This means that a
new replica can be deployed approximately every 3 minutes. There are 6 replicas,
so a given replica is obfuscated and rebooted every 18 minutes. In comparison,
with decentralized protocols, reobfuscation, reboot, and recovery in sequence take
about 15 minutes, so a given replica is obfuscated and rebooted every 90 minutes.
The cost of using our decentralized protocols for generating executables affects
the Reboot Clock version: it has the same performance as the Decentralized ver-
sion, except for a longer window of vulnerability caused by the extra time needed
for CD-ROM-based executable generation.
Key distribution for Replica Refresh involves generating, signing, and dissem-
inating a new key for a recovering replica. In the decentralized implementation,
replicas must also refresh their shares of the private key for the service at each
epoch change and participate in a share recovery protocol for the recovering replica
after reboot. The costs of generating, signing, and disseminating a new key are
small in both versions, but the costs of share refresh and share recovery are signif-
icant.
Throughput. To understand the throughput achieved during share refresh and
share recovery, we ran an experiment in which one replica is rebooted. We mea-
sured throughput of two versions that differ only in how key distribution is done:
the Centralized version uses a centralized Controller while the Decentralized ver-
sion requires the rebooting replicas to generate their own keys and use the key
distribution protocol of x2.2.3 to create and distribute a certiﬁcate for this key.
Figure 4 shows throughput for these two versions in the ﬁrewall prototype
while the outside client applies a constant UDP load at 3300 kB/s. During the ﬁrst
50 seconds, all replicas process packets normally, but at the time marked “epoch
change”, one replica reboots and the epoch changes. In the Decentralized ver-
sion, non-rebooting replicas run the share refresh protocol at this point; the high
CPU overhead of this protocol in the CODEX implementation of APSS causes
throughput to drop to about 340 kB/s, which is about 11% of the maximum. In
the Centralized version, replicas have no shares to refresh, and they perform leader
adjustment to take the rebooting replica into account, so there is no throughput
drop.
At the point marked “recovery” in Figure 4, the recovering replica runs the
State Recovery mechanism in both versions. In the Decentralized version, the
recovering replica also runs its share recovery protocol. Throughput drops more
in the Decentralized version than the Centralized version due to the extra CPU
overhead of executing share recovery.
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Figure 4: Two key distribution methods for the ﬁrewall prototype at an applied load
of 3300 kB/s
Latency. Latency increases during share refresh. The same experiment as for
measuring throughput shows that the Centralized version has a latency of 37  2
ms after an epoch change, similar to its latency of 39  3 ms when there are no
failures. But latency in the Decentralized version goes up to 2138  985 ms during
the same interval. The high latency occurs because few packets can be processed
while APSS performs share refresh. Latency also increases slightly during share
recovery in the Decentralized version to 65  26 ms.
3.2.2.4 State Recovery
State Recovery does not signiﬁcantly degrade throughput, as shown in Figure 4
for the Centralized version at the point labeled “recovery”. The low cost of state
recovery is due to the small amount of state stored by our ﬁrewall for each packet
stream; each stream is represented by a structure that contains 240 bytes. And the
outside client uses multiple 75 kB/s packet streams to generate load for the ﬁrewall.
So, there are 44 streams at an applied load of 3300 kB/s. This corresponds to 10560
bytes of state; recovery then requires each replica to send 8 packets with at most
1500 bytes each. The overhead of sending and receiving 8 packets from t + 1 = 2
replicas and updating the state of pf at the recovering replica is small.
4 Quorum System Replica Management
Aquorumsystem[48,18,19]storesobjectscontainingobjectstate; objectssupport
operations to modify their object state. A quorum system is deﬁned by a collection
28Q of quorums—sets of replicas that satisfy an intersection property guaranteeing
some speciﬁed overlap between any pair of quorums. Each replica stores object
states.
Clients of a quorum system perform an operation on an object by reading and
computing an object state from a quorum of replicas, executing the operation using
this object state, then writing the resulting object state back to a quorum of replicas.
We follow a common choice [30] for the semantics of concurrent operations:
1. Reads that are not concurrent with any write generate the latest object state
written, according to some serial order on the previous writes.
2. Reads that are concurrent with writes either abort, which means they do
not generate an object state, or they return a prior object state that is not
guaranteed to be the latest object state written.
On abort, clients can retry the operation.
The object state stored by a replica is labeled by the client that wrote this object
state; this label is a totally ordered, monotonically increasing sequence number and
iskeptaspartoftheobjectstate. Replicasonlystoreanewobjectstateforanobject
o if it is labeled with a higher sequence number than the object state being stored
by this replica for o.
An intersection property on quorums ensures that a client reading from a quo-
rum obtains the most recently written object state. For instance, when there are no
crashed or compromised replicas, we could require that any two quorums have a
non-empty intersection; then any quorum from which a client reads an object over-
laps with any quorum to which a client writes that object. So, a client always reads
the latest object state written to a quorum when there are no concurrent writes.
Byzantine quorum systems [30] are deﬁned by a pair (Q;B); collection Q of
replica sets is as before, and collection B deﬁnes the possible sets of compromised
replicas. By assumption, in any execution of an operation, only replicas in a some
set B in B may be compromised. In a threshold fail-prone system, at most some
threshold t of replicas can be compromised, so B consists of all replica sets of size
less than or equal to t.
Ourprototypeimplementsadisseminationquorumsystem[30]; thisisaByzan-
tine quorum system where object state is self-verifying and, therefore, there is a
public veriﬁcation function that succeeds for an object state only if this object state
has not been changed by a compromised replica. For instance, an object state
signed by a client with a digital signature is self-verifying, since signature veriﬁca-
tion succeeds only if the object state is unmodiﬁed from what the client produced.
A dissemination quorum system with B as a threshold fail-prone system for
threshold t must satisfy the following properties [30]:
29(4.1) Threshold DQS Correctness. 8Q1;Q2 2 Q : jQ1 \ Q2j > t
(4.2) Threshold DQS Availability. 8Q 2 Q : n   t  jQj
Threshold DQS Correctness (4.1) and Threshold DQS Availability (4.2) are satis-
ﬁed if n = 3t + 1 holds and, for any quorum Q, jQj = 2t + 1 holds, since then
8Q1;Q2 2 Q : jQ1 \ Q2j = t + 1 > t and 8Q 2 Q : n   t = 2t + 1 = jQj
both hold, as required.
Given these properties, a client can read the latest object state by querying and
receiving responses from a quorum. Threshold DQS Availability (4.2) guarantees
that some quorum is available to be queried. And Threshold DQS Correctness
guarantees that any pair of quorums overlaps in at least t + 1 replicas, hence at
least one correct replica. The latest object state is written to a quorum, so any
quorum that replies to a client contains at least one correct replica that has stored
this latest object state. To determine which object state to perform an operation on,
a client chooses the object state that it receives with the highest sequence number.
This works because object states are totally ordered by sequence number and are
self-verifying, so the client can choose the most recently written state from only
those replies containing object state on which the veriﬁcation function succeeds.
If object states were not self-verifying, then compromised replicas could invent
a new object state and provide more than one copy of it to clients—these clients
would not be able to decide which object state to use when performing an opera-
tion. With object states required to be self-verifying, the worst that compromised
replicas can do is withhold an up-to-date object state.
Dissemination quorums guarantee that the latest object state is returned if ob-
jects are not written by compromised clients. If compromised replicas knew the
signing key for a compromised client, then these replicas could sign an object state
with a higher sequence number than had been written. Clients then would choose
the object state created by the compromised replicas. One way to prevent such
attacks is by allowing only one client per object o to write object state for o but
allowing any client to read it.21
When at most r replicas in a threshold fail-prone system with threshold t might
be rebooted proactively, a quorum system must take these rebooting replicas into
account. Maintaining Threshold DQS Availability (4.2) requires that there be a
quorum that clients can contact even when t+r replicas are unavailable. Formally,
we can write this property as follows:
(4.3) Proactive Threshold DQS Availability.
8Q 2 Q : n   (t + r)  jQj
21Allowing only a single client per object to write object state is reasonable for many applications.
For instance, web pages are often updated by a single host and accessed by many.
30Setting n = 3t+2r +1 and deﬁning quorums to be any sets of size n (t+r) =
2t + r + 1 sufﬁces to guarantee Proactive Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) (as
shown previously by Sousa et al. [47]). This follows because n   (t + r) = jQj
holds, and this satisﬁes Proactive Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) directly.
Given that r replicas might be rebooting, hence unavailable, it might seem that
requiring only t+1 replicas in quorum intersections would be insufﬁcient to guar-
antee that clients receive the most up-to-date object state. But Proactive Threshold
DQS Availability (4.3) guarantees that a quorum ^ Q of 2t+r+1 replicas is always
available, where ^ Q does not contain any rebooting replicas. By deﬁnition, an in-
tersection between ^ Q and any other quorum consists only of replicas that are not
rebooting. So, an overlap of t + 1 replicas from ^ Q is sufﬁcient to guarantee that at
least one correct replica replies with the most up-to-date object state, as long as no
writes are executing concurrently. So, Proactive Threshold DQS Correctness (4.4)
is the same as Threshold DQS Correctness (4.1):
(4.4) Proactive Threshold DQS Correctness.
8Q1;Q2 2 Q : jQ1 \ Q2j > t
The values of the quorum size (jQj = 2t+r+1) and the number of replicas chosen
above (n = 3t + 2r + 1) sufﬁce to satisfy this property, since any two replica sets
of size 2t + r + 1 out of 3t + 2r + 1 replicas overlap in at least t + 1 > t replicas.
4.1 A Storage-Service Prototype
To conﬁrm the generality of the various proactive obfuscation mechanisms we im-
plemented for the ﬁrewall prototype, we also implemented a storage-service proto-
type using a dissemination quorum system over a threshold fail-prone system with
threshold t and 1 concurrently rebooting replica. The prototype supports read and
write operations on objects with self-verifying object state. Object states stored by
replicas are indexed by an object ID. The object state for each object can only be
written by a single client, so the object ID contains a client ID. Clients sign object
state with RSA signatures to make the object state self-verifying; the client ID is
the client’s public key.
The storage service supports two operations, which are implemented by the
replicas as follows. A query operation for a given object ID returns the latest cor-
responding object state or a unknown-object message, which means that no replica
currently stores an object state for this object ID. An update operation is used to
store a new object state; a replica only performs an update when given an object
state having a higher sequence number than what it currently stores. If a replica
can apply an update, then it sends a conﬁrmation to the client; the conﬁrmation
31contains the object ID and the sequence number from the updated object state.
Otherwise, it sends an error containing the object ID and the sequence number to
the client.
Adding proactive obfuscation to this service requires instantiating the output
synthesis and state synthesis functions as well as deﬁning the action taken by a
replica on receiving a state recovery request.
Synthesis Functions. Both the output and state synthesis functions involve re-
ceiving replies from a quorum.
For the individual authentication implementation of Reply Synthesis, the out-
put synthesis function operates as follows. Object states are deﬁned to be output
similar if they have the same object ID. So, output synthesis for object states re-
turned by queries waits until it has received correctly-signed, output-similar object
states from a quorum. Then it returns the object state in that set with the highest
sequence number or an unknown-object message if all replies contain unknown-
object messages. Conﬁrmations are deﬁned to be output similar if they have the
sameobjectIDandsequencenumber. So, forupdates, theoutputsynthesisfunction
returns a conﬁrmation for an object ID and sequence number when it has received
output-similar conﬁrmations for this object ID and sequence number from a quo-
rum. Otherwise, it returns abort if no complete quorum returned conﬁrmations (so,
some replies must have been errors instead of conﬁrmations). In both cases,  is
set to the quorum size.
ThethresholdcryptographyimplementationofReply Synthesisisincompatible
with dissemination quorum systems. A client of a dissemination quorum system
must authenticate replies from a quorum of replicas, and different correct replicas
in that quorum might send different object states in response to the same query—
dissemination quorum systems only guarantee that at least one correct replica in
a quorum returns object state will have the most up-to-date sequence number.
This weaker guarantee violates the assumption of the threshold cryptography Reply
Synthesis mechanism that at least t+1 replicas send an identical value. So, we are
restricted to using the individual authentication implementation of Reply Synthesis
in our storage-service prototype.22
For state synthesis, object states are deﬁned to be state similar if they have
the same object ID. Unknown-object messages from replicas are state similar with
each other and with object states if they have the same object ID. We say that sets
22Other implementations [30] of Byzantine quorum systems require more overlap between quo-
rums. In some, 2t + 1 replicas must appear in the intersection of any two quorums, hence the
intersection will include at least t + 1 correct replicas that return the most up-to-date object state.
The threshold cryptography implementation of Reply Synthesis would work in such a Byzantine
quorum system, since the threshold for signature reassembly is t + 1.
32containing object states and unknown-object messages are state similar if, for any
object state with a given object ID in one of the sets, each other set has an object
stateoranunknown-objectmessagewiththesameobjectID.So, thestatesynthesis
function waits until it receives correctly-signed, state-similar sets from a quorum
and, for each object state o in at least one set, returns the object state for o with the
highest sequence number. This means that  is also set to the quorum size.
Since object states are self-verifying, they cannot be modiﬁed by replicas; this
means that all replicas must return object states sent by clients. Therefore, there is
no need for marshaling and unmarshaling an abstract state representation, unlike
in the ﬁrewall prototype.
State Recovery Request. A recovering replica sends a state recovery request in
the storage-service prototype to all replicas and waits until it has received replies
from a quorum; upon receiving a state recovery request, a correct replica sends
the object state for each object it has stored to the recovering replica. Since object
state is self-verifying, it does not need to be signed by the sending replica. For
each object state with object ID o that was received from one replica i but not from
another replica j, the recovering replica inserts an unknown-object message with
object ID o in the reply from j.23 This makes the object IDs found in each reply
set the same, and, therefore, makes the replies received by the recovering replica
state similar.
A recovering replica must acquire enough state to replace any replica. To do so,
it must acquire the current object state for each object at the time it recovers. We
characterize this formally, deﬁning s to be the current maximum sequence number
for an object o as follows:
 the correct replicas in some quorum have object state for o with sequence
number s, and
 if the correct replicas in any other quorum have object state for o with se-
quence number s0, then s0  s.
The recovery protocol for quorum systems must then satisfy the following
property, which guarantees, for each object, that replicas recover an object state
with at least the current maximum sequence number at the time recovery starts.
23A replica replying to a state recovery request also sends a signed list of the object IDs that it will
send. This list allows the recovering replica to know which object states to expect. So, the recovering
replica knows when it has received all the object states from a quorum. At this time, it can safely
add unknown-object messages for each object state that was received from some, but not all, replicas
in the quorum. An added unknown-object message need not be signed, since it is only used by the
replica that creates it.
33(4.5) QS State Recovery. For each object o with current maximum se-
quence number s at the time replica i starts the recovery protocol, there is a
bound  such that i recovers an object state for o with sequence number s0
such that s0  s holds in  seconds.
TheStateRecovery protocolofx2.2.2, usingthedeﬁnitionofthestaterecovery
request above, satisﬁes QS State Recovery (4.5). To see why, notice that Proactive
Threshold DQS Availability (4.3) guarantees that some quorum is available even
when one replica is rebooting. The recovery request from a rebooting replica goes
to a quorum, and Proactive Threshold DQS Correctness (4.4) guarantees that, for
each object o, this quorum intersects in at least one correct replica with the quorum
that had object state for o with the current maximum sequence number for o at the
time the recovery protocol started. So, this correct replica answers with object state
for o with a sequence number that is at least the value of the current maximum
sequence number for o when the recovery protocol started. The state synthesis
function will thus return an object state with at least this sequence number. The
recovering replica then processes incoming operations that it has queued during
execution of the State Recovery protocol, so it recovers with an up-to-date state.
Timely Links (2.7) and Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6), along with the
assumed bound on state size, guarantee that this protocol terminates in a bounded
amount of time.
Recovering replicas in the storage-service prototype implement a simple op-
timization for State Recovery: since client inputs are signed and have a totally-
ordered sequence number, a recovering replica can process inputs that it receives
while executing State Recovery instead of recording the inputs and processing
them after. If a recovering replica stores an object state with a higher sequence
number than the one it eventually recovers, then the older state is dropped instead
of being stored after recovery. This means that State Recovery terminates for a re-
covering replica immediately once this replica receives  state-similar replies. And
this optimization does not interfere with completing State Recovery in a bounded
amount of time, because there is an assumed maximum rate for inputs received
by the replicas, and there is a bound on the amount of time needed to process any
input, by Approximately Synchronized Clocks (2.6).
4.2 Performance of the Storage-Service Prototype
The performance of the storage-service prototype depends on the mechanism im-
plementations used for Reply Synthesis, State Recovery, and Replica Refresh.
Input Coordination is not needed for quorum systems, and the threshold cryptog-
raphy Reply Synthesis mechanism is not applicable. All versions of our prototype
34Version name Replica Refresh
epoch reobf key
Replicated none none none
Centralized cntrl cntrl cntrl
Decentralized cntrl cntrl dcntrl
Reboot Clock dcntrl dcntrl dcntrl
Table 2: The versions of our storage-service prototype.
use the State Recovery implementation from x2.2.2 with the state recovery request
as described in x4.1. Table 2 enumerates the salient characteristics of the three ver-
sions of the prototype we analyzed. We also present a Replicated version that does
not perform any proactive recovery for replicas.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
To measure performance of the storage-service prototype, we use the same experi-
mental setup as described in x3.2.1, with t = 1 and n = 6; a quorum is any set of
4 replicas. Since the Replicated version does not perform proactive obfuscation or
reboot replicas, it only needs to have n = 3t+1 = 4 replicas, and it uses quorums
consisting of 2t + 1 = 3 replicas.
We implemented the storage-service server and client in C using OpenSSL.
Neither server nor client makes any assumptions about replication—the client is
designed to communicate with a single instance of the server. All replication is
handled by the mechanism implementations.
There is a single client connected to both the input and output networks; this
client submits all operations to the prototype and receives all replies. With no
Input Coordination, there is no batching of input packets, but replicas sign batched
output for the client up to batch size 20—we describe our reasons for selecting this
batching size in x4.2.2. Replicas do not currently write to disk for crash recovery.
4.2.2 Performance Measurements
We measure throughput and latency. Each reported value is a mean of at least 5
runs; error bars depict the sample standard deviation of the measurements around
this mean.
4.2.2.1 Reply Synthesis
We performed experiments to quantify the performance of the individual authenti-
cation implementation for Reply Synthesis. In our experiments, replicas start with
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Figure 5: Overall throughput for the storage-service prototype
a set of 4-byte integer objects from the client. The client performs queries, but not
updates, on randomly chosen objects at a speciﬁed rate. This workload allows us
to characterize two things: an upper bound on the throughput of the service and a
lower bound on its latency, since the objects are as small as possible, and queries
do not incur CPU time on the client for signatures or on the server for veriﬁca-
tion (whereas updates would). Update operations by the client would increase the
cryptographic load on the client and server, hence slow both down.
Figure 5 graphs throughput for these experiments—throughput of the Central-
izedversionpeaksat1360queries/secondatanappliedloadof1550queries/second.
After this point, throughput declines slightly as the applied load increases. This
decline is due to the increasing cost of queries that must be dropped because they
cannot be handled. The “QU” curve shows the performance of a single server
and thus ﬁxes the best possible case. The throughput of the server starts saturat-
ing at about 1800 queries/second, and increases slightly with higher applied loads.
Throughput saturation occurs in both the QU and Centralized cases due to CPU
saturation. The difference in behavior at saturation is due, in part, to implementing
the storage-service prototype in user space instead of in the kernel—replicas copy
packets from the kernel and manage them there. The kernel never accumulates
a signiﬁcant queue of packets in the experiments we ran, since it deletes packets
once they have been copied. In particular, even packets that are dropped are ﬁrst
copied from the kernel to user space. So, high loads induce a signiﬁcant CPU over-
head in the replicas. In the single server version, packet queues are managed by
the OpenBSD kernel, so dropping packets is signiﬁcantly less costly—we expect
to see the same effect of decreasing throughput in the QU plot, but at much higher
36applied loads.
The Replicated version has exactly the same performance as the Centralized
version. This is because quorum systems do not use Input Coordination, so each
replica handles packets independently of all others. Thus, CPU saturation occurs
in the Replicated version at exactly the same number of queries per second as in
the Centralized version.
The latency of the storage-service prototype in these experiments is 21  1
ms for applied load below the throughput saturation value. When the system is
saturated, latency of requests that are not dropped increases to 205  3 ms. The
higher latency at saturation is due to bounded queues ﬁlling in the replica and in
the OpenBSD kernel, since the latency of a packet includes the time needed to
process all packets ahead of it in these queues. The queue implementations in the
ﬁrewall and storage-service prototypes are different, so these latency behaviors are
incomparable.
CPU saturation occurs at applied loads above 1360 queries/second—the maxi-
mum load a replica can handle. Given this bound, we perform our experiments for
Replica Refresh and State Recovery at an applied load of 1400 queries/second, and
thus show behavior at saturation. We allow servers to reach a steady state in their
processing of packets before starting our measurements. This ensures that replicas
are not measured in their startup transients, where throughput and latency have not
stabilized.
To select a suitable batching factor, we performed an experiment in which a
client applied a query load sufﬁcient to saturate the service and varied the batching
factor. Figure 6 shows the results. Throughput reaches a plateau at a maximum
batching factor of 20. The batching factor achieved by replicas can also be seen
in Figure 6—it also reaches a peak at a maximum batching factor of 20 and de-
clines slightly thereafter (the throughput decline is due to the overhead of unﬁlled
batches). So, we chose a batching factor of 20.
Unlike in the ﬁrewall prototype, throughput here is unaffected by the crash
of a single replica. Throughput in the ﬁrewall prototype decreases due to slow-
down in Input Coordination, but the storage-service prototype does not use Input
Coordination.
4.2.2.2 Replica Refresh
The only component of Replica Refresh that causes signiﬁcant performance differ-
ences in throughput and latency between prototype versions is share refresh and
share recovery. We do not show results for the Reboot Clock version, since the
only difference between the Reboot Clock version and the Decentralized version is
that the Reboot Clock version has a longer epoch length, hence longer window of
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Figure 6: Batching factor and throughput for the storage-service prototype under
saturation
vulnerability.
Throughput. Query throughput measurements given in Figure 7 conﬁrm the re-
sults of x3.2.2.3, which compares centralized and decentralized key distribution
for the ﬁrewall prototype. The experiment used to generate these numbers is the
same as for Reply Synthesis: a client sends random queries at a speciﬁed rate to
the storage-service prototype, which replies with the appropriate object. We elim-
inate the costs of State Recovery by providing the appropriate state directly to the
recovering replica—this isolates the cost of key distribution. As in the ﬁrewall
prototype, the CPU overhead of APSS recovery causes a throughput drop at epoch
change. Throughput decreases to about 36% (the ﬁrewall prototype dropped to
11%) for the Decentralized version, whereas the Centralized version continues at
constant throughput for the whole experiment. We also observe a slight drop in
the Decentralized version at recovery due to the share recovery protocol run for the
rebooting replica. This drop is shorter in duration than in the corresponding graph
for the ﬁrewall prototype, since only share recovery is executed rather than State
Recovery and share recovery in sequence.
The difference in throughput between the ﬁrewall and storage-service proto-
types during share refresh can be explained by differences in CPU utilization. The
storage-service prototype spends more of its CPU time in the kernel, whereas the
ﬁrewall prototype spends most of its CPU time in user space performing crypto-
graphic operations for agreement. We believe that kernel-level packet handling
operations performed by the storage service mesh better with the high CPU utiliza-
tion of APSS than the cryptographic operations performed by the ﬁrewall.
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Figure 7: Two key distribution methods for the storage-service prototype at an
applied load of 1400 queries/second
The same experiment run at 1300 queries/second (slightly below the satu-
ration threshold) exhibits a throughput decrease during share refresh from 1300
queries/second to 750 queries/second; this is 57%. Throughput remains higher
during share refresh in the non-saturated case than the saturated case, because the
storage service does not use the CPU as much and, therefore, does not compete as
much with APSS. Moreover, the higher load of queries in the saturated case forces
the storage service to spend more CPU resources dropping packets than it must
spend in the non-saturated case.
Latency. ThesameexperimentsasforFigure7leadtoasimilargraphforlatency.
LatencyintheDecentralizedcaseforthestorage-serviceprototypeincreasesto646
 89 ms during share refresh, as opposed to 205  3 ms for the same interval in
the Centralized case. This latency is lower than what was seen in x3.2.2.3 for
the ﬁrewall prototype during share refresh. As for throughput, we believe this is
due to the kernel-level packet handling operations of the storage-service prototype
competing better with the high CPU costs of APSS in user space. Latency also
increases slightly during share recovery. The Decentralized version has a latency
of 233  3 ms during share recovery, whereas the Centralized version has a latency
of 203  1 ms.
4.2.2.3 State Recovery
The number of object states that must be recovered after a reboot in the storage-
service prototype signiﬁcantly effects throughput and latency. The state of the stor-
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Figure 8: Throughput under varying numbers of objects to recover for the storage-
service prototype
age service increases linearly in the number of object states stored (although each
object state in the prototype only contains a 4-byte integer, each also has headers
of length 24 bytes and a signature of length 64 bytes, so each object contains 92
bytes). So, a storage-service state with 115 object states has 10580 bytes (which
corresponds to a ﬁrewall state with about 44 packet streams, since each stream has
a state of size 240 bytes). This corresponds to an applied load of 3300 kB/s, by the
same calculation as in x3.2.2.4. And, therefore, the amount of state held by replicas
in the ﬁrewall prototype under saturation is held by replicas in the storage-service
prototype when there are 115 object states.
However, we would typically expect a storage service to have many more than
115 object states. To conﬁrm the analysis of x2.3.2 without using too many object
states, our storage-service prototype uses a simple implementation of the state re-
covery request that does not batch object states for recovery, but instead uses one
round of communication for each object state from each replica. Of course, the
cost of recovery can be reduced by batching object states and preventing identical
object states from being sent by multiple replicas. But this does not change the
linear relationship between recovery time and the number of object states.
Throughput. Figure 8 shows the effect of State Recovery on throughput when
different numbers of object states must be recovered. As before, in this experiment,
a single client sends queries to the service. The recovering replica must then re-
cover all objects from other replicas. We use only the Centralized version, so that
share recovery does not inﬂuence the measurements.
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Figure 9: Latency under varying numbers of objects to recover for the storage-
service prototype
Figure 8 shows that throughput drops during State Recovery to about 470
queries/s for time directly proportional to the number of objects being recovered—
there is a linear relationship, where each object adds about 260 ms to the recovery
time. This reduction in throughput is due to the CPU time replicas spend sending
and receiving recovery messages for objects (instead of processing inputs from the
client).
Latency. Figure 9 compares latency during recovery in the same experiments
used to generate Figure 8. In these experiments, we see that latency increases to
a maximum of about 600 ms and stays there until recovery completes—a time
directly proportional to the number of objects that need to be recovered, as would
be expected from the throughput. Like the decrease in throughput, this increase in
latency is due to the replicas spending CPU time processing packets for recovery
instead of processing queries from clients.
5 Discussion
Replication improves reliability but can be expensive and, therefore, only services
that require high resilience to server failure ought to be replicated. Proactive ob-
fuscation adds to this expense but transforms a fault-tolerant service into an attack-
tolerant service. Not all services require this additional degree of resilience, and
we show in this paper what the additional costs are in implementing proactive ob-
fuscation. The costs are far from prohibitive. For instance, our ﬁrewall prototype’s
41performance only differs from a replicated implementation without proactive ob-
fuscation by exhibiting 92% of the throughput.
Moreover, twosigniﬁcantcostsinourprototypescanactuallybereduced. First,
our implementation of proactive obfuscation was done in user space—moving
these mechanisms to the kernel would avoid the cost of transferring packets across
the kernel-user boundary. Second, the cost of digital signatures for individual au-
thentication could be signiﬁcantly reduced by using MACs. This is actually an
optimization of the same individual authentication Reply Synthesis implementa-
tion using digital signatures, and thus not fundamentally different from the case
we studied. However, the use of MACs also requires replicas to set up shared keys
with clients and with each other, and this cost must be added to the refresh and
recovery costs already present in our prototypes.
The attack tolerance of a service employing proactive obfuscation depends fun-
damentally on what obfuscator(s) are in use. Our work, by design, is independent
of this choice. That said, our Obfuscation Independence (2.1) and Bounded Adver-
sary (2.2) do provide a basis for examining and comparing obfuscation techniques.
It is an open problem which obfuscation techniques satisfy these requirements. On
the one hand, Shacham et al. [45] shows that obfuscated executables are easily
compromised if they are generated by obfuscators not using enough randomness.
On the other hand, Pucella and Schneider [39] analyze the effectiveness of obfus-
cation in general as a defense and show that it can be reduced to a form of dynamic
type checking, which bodes well for the general approach. They also present a the-
oretical framework for obfuscation and analyze obfuscation for a particular C-like
language. This gives an upper bound on how good particular techniques might be.
Proactive obfuscation basically trades availability for integrity. In particular, an
obfuscated replica that is processing an attack is likely to crash (because the attack
is unlikely to be well matched to the obfuscations that were applied). This also
has the effect of limiting the rate at which adversaries can vet their attacks. And
this, in turn, blunts adversary attempts at automated attack generation as a way to
overcome the short windows of vulnerability that proactive obfuscation imposes.
Denialofserviceattackscanviolateourassumptionsaboutsynchronicity, since
we make strong assumptions about our servers and network communication in Ap-
proximatelySynchronizedClocks (2.6)andTimelyLinks (2.7). Thissynchronicity
is needed for State Recovery. To see why, recall that replicas are rebooted based on
timeouts in the reboot clock. No information ﬂows from the replicas to the reboot
clock, and, therefore, there is no way to change the timing of reboots based on the
time needed for recovery. Thus, recovering replicas must recover within a given
amount of time, and, therefore, strong assumptions on synchronicity are needed to
ensure that State Recovery completes in a timely manner. The alternative is to al-
low information to ﬂow from the replicas to a device that causes reboots. We do not
42use this implementation, since a device receiving information from replicas might
be compromised. Other than for State Recovery, we use asynchronous protocols,
like Byzantine Paxos and APSS, to implement the mechanisms for proactive ob-
fuscation. This provides our system with the maximum resilience to attacks on
availability, given the synchronicity constraint on State Recovery.24
DoS attacks reduce availability and are not blunted by proactive obfuscation.
DoS attacks by clients overloading a resource must still be countered by block-
ing the offending requests or terminating their source(s). And for DoS attacks by
servers overloading some resource, the usual defenses apply, such as per-server
resource limits and elimination of resource sharing.
However, DoS attacks that cause replicas to crash can keep correct replicas
from ever recovering without outside intervention if the attack leverages state writ-
ten to disk and later read for recovery. Such an attack could work as follows. A
replica i receives a packet that exercises a ﬂaw in i, eventually causing i to crash.
But i writes state to disk before crashing, including that packet or the effect of
its execution. After i crashes and reboots, the state that i reads from disk dur-
ing recovery might cause i to crash again. In this case, replica i will continue to
reboot, read its state, and crash until it is rebooted for proactive obfuscation. If
too many replicas have crashed in this manner, then State Recovery will no longer
complete successfully, so replicas will not recover. And the service will not be able
to process input packets. This attack must be resolved by intervention of a human
operator.
Related Research
Proactive obfuscation provides two functions critical to building robust systems in
the face of attack: proactively recovering state and proactively maintaining inde-
pendence. Prior work has focused on the former but largely ignored the latter.
State Recovery. The goal of proactive state recovery for replicated systems is to
put replicas in a known good state, whether or not corruption has occurred or been
detected. Software rejuvenation [22, 50] and Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance
[21] both implement replicated systems that periodically take replicas ofﬂine for
this kind of state recovery. In both, replication masks individual replica unavail-
ability, resulting in a system that achieves higher reliability in the face of crash
failures as well as some attacks. However, neither defends against attacks that
exploit software bugs.
24The strong requirements on RepeatRequest messages for Byzantine Paxos are only needed for
State Recovery.
43Microreboot [6] separates state from code and restarts application components
torecoverfromfailures. Componentscanberestartedwithoutrebootingservers, so
theserestartscanbeperformedquickly. Andtheseparationofstateandcodeallows
restartedcomponentstorecoverstatetransparentlyandquickly. Thisworkdoesnot
address the problem of handling compromise caused by exploitable software bugs
but could beused in conjunctionwith proactive obfuscation toincrease replica fault
tolerance.
In systems that tolerate compromised servers, proactive state recovery becomes
more complex, since replicas in these systems use distributed protocols to manage
state. BFT-PR [10] adds proactive state recovery to Practical Byzantine Fault-
Tolerance [9]. Proactive state recovery here is analogous to key refresh in proactive
secret sharing [20] (PSS) protocols; it is a means of defending against replica com-
promise by limiting the window of vulnerability for attacks on replica state, just as
the window of vulnerability for keys is limited by PSS. However, BFT-PR never
changes the code used by its replicas; in fact, its state recovery mechanism depends
on replica code being unmodiﬁed. Recovery in BFT-PR also relies on state written
by replicas to disk—the BFT-PR implementation assumes implicitly that replicas
will not crash or be compromised upon reading state written by a compromised
replica. We do not make this assumption, since it rules out the possibility of denial
of service attacks that cause replicas to crash on reading their state, as discussed
above.
Further, public keys in BFT-PR are never changed (though symmetric keys
established using these public keys are proactively refreshed), because a secure
cryptographic co-processor is assumed. Our Replica Refresh provides a better de-
fense against repeat attacks, since attacks that compromise a replica in BFT-PR
can compromise this replica again after it has recovered. However, the experi-
ments of x3.2.2.3 and x4.2.2.2 show that our implementations of these aspects of
Replica Refresh incur a non-trivial cost at epoch change and recovery across dif-
ferent approaches to replica management, and this may increase the time available
for adversaries to compromise t + 1 replicas. Knowledge of these costs and ben-
eﬁts allows a system designer to choose the appropriate mechanism for a given
application.
Independence. Replicafailureindependencehasbeenstudiedextensivelyincon-
nection with fault tolerance. In the N-version programming [1] approach to build-
ing fault-tolerant systems, replica implementations were programmed indepen-
dently as a way to achieve independence. The DEDIX (the DEsign DIversity
eXperiment) N-version system [1] consists of diverse replicas and a supervisor pro-
gram that runs these diverse replicas in parallel and performs Input Coordination
44and Reply Synthesis; it can be implemented either using a single server or in a
distributed fashion. But even running independently-designed replicas does not
prevent an adversary from learning the different vulnerabilities of these replicas
and compromising them one by one over time.
Recent work on N-variant systems [12] uses multiple different copies of a pro-
gram to vote on output. The diverse variants of the program are generated using
obfuscators, but all are run by a trusted monitor (a potential high-leverage target of
attack) that computes the output from the answers given by these different copies.
The monitor compares responses from variants and deems a variant compromised
if it produced a response that differs from the other variants. However, variants are
never reobfuscated, so variants that are compromised can be compromised again if
restarted automatically. And if variants are not restarted automatically, then inter-
vention by a human operator is necessary.
Similarly, TightLip [52] creates sandboxed replicas, called doppelgangers, of
processes in an operating system. The goal of TightLip is to detect leaks of data
designated sensitive—doppelgangers are spawned when a process tries to read sen-
sitive data and are given data identical to the original process except that sensitive
data is replaced by fabricated data that is not sensitive. The original and the dop-
pelganger are run concurrently; if their outputs are identical, then, with high prob-
ability, the output of the original does not depend on the sensitive data and can
be output. TightLip shares with our work the goal of using multiple replicas of a
program to achieve higher resilience to failure, but TightLip seeks only to detect
data leaks rather than handling compromised replicas.
It is rare to ﬁnd multiple independent implementations of exactly the same ser-
vice, due to the cost of building each. BASE [41] addresses this by using different
implementations and providing an abstraction layer to unify the differences and
thereby facilitate communication and state recovery. However, replicas in BASE
are limited to pre-existing implementations. And these replicas can be compro-
mised immediately upon recovery if they have been compromised before, since
their code does not change during recovery.
The idea that replicas exhibiting some measure of independence could be gen-
erated by running an obfuscator multiple times with different secret keys on a sin-
gle program was ﬁrst published by Forrest et al. [17]. They discuss several general
techniques for obfuscation, from adding, deleting, and reordering code to memory
and linking randomization. They implement a stack reordering obfuscation and
show how it disrupts buffer-overﬂow attacks. Many obfuscation techniques have
since been developed.
Address obfuscation [5, 38, 51] permutes the code and data segments of a pro-
gram as it is loaded into memory. Under this obfuscation, attacks that rely on the
absolute or relative locations of code or data in memory are not likely to succeed,
45since these locations are unknown—attacks might reveal some information about
randomized locations, but code and data locations can be rerandomized each time
an executable is loaded.
Instruction-set randomization [24, 3, 2] transforms the instruction encoding
in a given instruction set—in one implementation, instructions are XOR’d with a
random key before being stored. These instructions must be XOR’d with the same
key to recover the original instruction stream. Therefore, injected instructions from
an adversary are unlikely to decode into a useful attack. Similarly, interpreted
languages can be randomized with low overhead by modifying the interpreter. But
without specialized hardware, instruction-set randomization is expensive for code
run natively on a processor, since each instruction must be translated before it is
executed.
DieHard [4] performs randomization of the run-time heap; attacks that rely on
heap locations are unlikely to succeed under such a transformation. DieHard can
also run multiple replicas of an executable and require that all replicas produce the
same output for that output to be taken as the output of the executable. This kind of
replication prevents many kinds of compromised replicas from providing incorrect
output, since attacks are unlikely to affect differently randomized heaps in the same
way.
Implementingproactiveobfuscationsometimeschangestheindependenceprop-
erties exhibited by our underlying approaches to replica management. For exam-
ple, quorum systems can provide a degree of data independence, since replicas do
not necessarily all store the same object states. This is because clients of a quo-
rum system interact only with a quorum rather than interacting with all replicas,
so different replicas receive different client messages, hence store different object
states. However, our storage-service prototype exhibits little data independence,
because it employs a hub to receive input from clients and, therefore, all replicas
tend to receive the same messages and store the same object state. In short, our pro-
totypes trade quorum system data independence to gain greater resilience against
parallel attacks on Obfuscation Independence (2.1) and Bounded Adversary (2.2),
as discussed in x2.
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